The Accidental Linguist

02 February 2008
What Has the Policy of Divide and Conquer Done to Iraq and the Iraqis?
Yasser Az-Zaatera (Palestinian)

Not a month goes by, and sometimes less than that, that we do not hear of some new alliance or joint report between a number of the Iraqi political entities; while below the surface battles of diverse forms and colors continue between these entities and groups, many of them using weapons—an issue which has increased considerably in recent times.

The case is that the famous English policy of divide and conquer has become the key word in the American handling of the Iraq issue, with the knowledge that the famous American Zionist politician Martin Indeek advised the Bush administration on it a few months after the occupation, saying that implementing it in this more expert way could take some time, which was no problem, as the Americans could use it to delve into the intricacies of the political situation and discover the majority of its details and contradicions.

If we follow the American political performance from the advent of the occupation until now, we will find it developing little by little in its understanding of the contradictions of the Iraqi sphere. The observer can sense this in Paul Bremer’s book and the views which he lays out in some detail in his evaluation of a number of Iraqi politicians.

And this with the knowledge that the reality of the American handling of the Iraqi case has shown that Washington politicians did not possess even the lowest degree of experience with the country’s affairs when they came unto it as occupiers.

At first glance the Sunni Arab sphere appears to be the most responsive to the policy of divide and conquer, but a more detailed look at the whole scene must reveal that the Shia sphere has also responsded to the mentioned policy, although to a less acute degree than its Sunni counterpart.

The Kurdish sphere alone has been safe from its workings, perhaps because the Americans did turn the screws against it. Also, of course, because all of its sectors appear to be in line with American designs on the one hand, and on the other hand because the Kurdish conflicts with the Arabs have unified them to some degree—though this cannot deny what goes on under the surface in the Kurdish sphere in terms of discontent with the two big parties whose leaders are characterized by lots of corruption.

And indeed there are many related cases, first and foremost Kirkuk between the Kurds and the Arabs, which have begun the path to a popular explosion in the face of Masoud Al-Barizani and Jalal At-Talibani. With the knowledge that a matter like this must have some external support, which is not being provided at the current time because of the American satisfaction on the path of the leaderships in Irbil and As-Suleimaniya.

And the truth cannot be overlooked that the American targetting of the Sunni Arab sphere resulted from its being the biggest drain on the occupation; they who embraced the choice of resistance, including its most extreme forms represented by Al-Qaeda.

At the same times that the problem of the Shia sphere was limited to the Sadrist trend which did not form a great burden really in light of the cooperation of the other entities, including the chief religious leaders, against it; reducing it to attract it away from the path of armed resistance to the occupation.

During the past year the Sunni Arab sphere has been engaged against itself to a terrifying extent, indeed hands-down the worst since the advent of the occupation. And if some attribute this to Al-Qaeda’s methods, then the other powers in the sphere are not absolved of their guilt, as their embroilment is the other factor in providing fertile ground for a face-off.

There is no disagreement that Al-Qaeda’s attempt to impose its model or program “The Islamic State of Iraq” onto the others could have cause much blood-letting and breaking up of unity and dissipation of efforts, but other parties contributed to this as well—leading among them the reckless fools who granted legitimacy to a political process which has relegated the Sunni Arabs to the realm of the minority, and made them like orphans at the poor house begging a miserable portion from a sectarian government led by Nouri Al-Maliki, knocking on Jalal Talibani’s door so that he will push for an improvement in their situation.

And when they failed they had nothing to do but put all their eggs in the basket of the occupation, ignoring the truth of its plan, ignoring the fact that the occupations allies among the Shia powers would not respond in kind a big step of this type, and ignoring also the fate of collaborators with the occupier as is told by the experiences of history.

The Secretary General of the Council of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Hareth Ad-Dari, called for dialogue with Al-Qaeda because the majority of its members are Iraqis, and it would have been possible to arrive at a point of understanding with it after it wad come into confrontation with all of the forces of the resistance and the tribal forces. But it was others who chose the path of total combat, which threw them into the arms of the occupier and pushed some of them to accept its sinful money and fight from behind its tanks and alongside its soldiers.

And here it is difficult to say that the forces which were founded for the “Tribal Awakening” program were really intended to respond to Al-Qaeda, even if it seems this way in some dimension. The more important dimension is represented by going back on the program of resistance and legitimizing cooperation with the occupier with the hope of receiving a better position at the expense of rivals among the Shia forces. This was done with inspiration from figures of the occupation, as is known by those involved.

Perhaps the defense of some areas was critical in what happened especially after Al-Qaeda began targetting a large number of figures on the accusation of cooperation with the occupier, ignoring the tribal dimensions of the areas in which it was working, who were not disposed to be convinced that their figures were collaborators and that they should allow them to be killed.

But all of this was not enough to push for the abandonment of resistance and cooperation with the occupier.

The awakening program has caused a fundamental shift in the compass of the Sunni Arabs from supporting the resistance and granting it the necessary acceptance to continue, to revolting against it in some way, even if this does not include all the forces.

And in this context it is worth mentioning that Al-Qaeda is the greatest targetter of the occupation, and if not then why chase it with huge B1 bombers? But it has mixed with that the targetting of non-combatant civilians, which has widened its loss of popular accepatance. This does not mean that the other forces have given up resistance, as they are still active although with a weaker capability than their old activities.

Here it is possible to say that the Council of Muslim Scholars—and with it some forces of the resistance—still keeps its correct compass by rejecting any reconciliation with the occupier, at the same time that it rejects the targetting of innocents in any way.

What must be mentioned in this context is the fate which awaits what is known as the “tribal awakening”. The “accomplishments” that it has achieved in the eyes of the occupiers have not led to benefits to the degree which was expected, or is expected by those who depend on it.

Al-Maliki’s government has rejected their integration into the army and the security apparatus, and the reason is that the greatest accomplishment according to Iraqi sectarian logic is controlling the army and to an even greater degree the security apparatus, and he will not allow them to be rebalanced through integration of the Awakening militias into them.

And so these militias have become vulnerable to Al-Qaeda’s revenge, and have also begun to meet with rejection in Sunni Arab circles due to their members falling into “bandit” actions in order to get money or for blood feuds and the domination of others.

In the Shia Arab sphere the policy of divide and conquer has made its mark as well, what with the continuous withdrawals from Maliki’s government seen equally from the Fadhila Party and the Sadrist Trend and the Iraqi List due to differences over plans for federalism, along side the armed struggle over the oil of the south and its profits along with other issues. Then there is the famous report on hundreds of groups and individuals in the south which targetted Iran for criticism to offset a piece of the division that is experienced by the [Shia] sphere.

The Sadrist Trends appears to be one of the most imporant powers that the divide and conquer policy has been used on, as a number of its figures have been targetted with a game of relativism and buying and selling, which has contributed to increasing the confusion in its political performance and its jumping from one corner to the other, and the shifting of its members from one front to the other.

And to some extent this is traced back to the limitations of As-Sayyed Moqtada’s political abilities, seeing as these types of games often succeed even with experiences powers and those with strong centralized leadership.

Here we will open an opposing line to explain the Kurdish attempt to play the Sunni and Shia political powers off eachother in order to control Kirkouk, and in order to improve the holdings of the Kurdish region at the expense of the central government and what is left of Iraq. This is shown by Al-Barizani and At-Talibani abandoning their agreement with Al-Hakeem and Al-Maliki and then signing an agreement with the leader of the Islamic Party Tareq Al-Hashimi.

Indeed the greatest danger which threatens the entire Iraqi sphere these days is that the policy of divide and conquer has lightened the burden on the American forces due to the reduction in resistance, as well as granting Washington a chance to negotiate a legal basis for a permanent military presence in Iraq through military bases which will tyrannize the country.

There is no place here for the talk of the American secretary of defense denying the purposes of these bases. While resistance has become rare in Shia areas, it is also not what it was even in Sunni Arab areas.

This does not necessarily mean that a decision was made to lighten its methods for political considerations. What is sure is that some of the forces turned their efforts against Al-Qaeda, while other forces engaged in secret discussions with the Americans to strike at their internal dissent. Thus the unity necessary to carry on the resistance in a meaningful way is absent.

All of this opens the way once again to a chance for the success of the occupation program, which will harm Iraq—first, because it sill stay under American military custody to draw attention away from its obvious formula, which will also harm Iran and the Arab community as well.

And from here it is necessary for us to say again that without Arab-Iranian agreement on a well-reasoned policy for handling the Iraq issue, as a loss would harm everybody.

And while the Shia and Sunni Arab politicians blunder about in their competition for American support, the Council of Muslim Scholars seems to be watching over everyone with its clear political compass, and with it at alongside it a number of forces of the resistance, pointing towards a continuation of action and rejection of any cooperation with the occupier under any label.

There is no doubt that this alone is what can cause the failure of the occupation program based on imposing peace and quiet, and thus the shift to military bases which will tyrannize the country, taking advantage of the deepening divisions among its people.

Matt